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ABSTRACT
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are systems comprising of computational systems
that interact with the physical world to perform sensing, communication, computation and
actuation. Common examples of these systems include Body Area Networks (BANs), Au-
tonomous Vehicles (AVs), Power Distribution Systems etc. The close coupling between
cyber and physical worlds in a CPS manifests in two types of interactions between comput-
ing systems and the physical world: intentional and unintentional. Unintentional interactions
result from the physical characteristics of the computing systems and often cause harm to
the physical world, if the computing nodes are close to each other, these interactions may
overlap thereby increasing the chances of causing a Safety hazard. Similarly, due to mobile
nature of computing nodes in a CPS planned and unplanned interactions with the physical
world occur. These interactions represent the behavior of a computing node while it is fol-
lowing a planned path and during faulty operations. Both of these interactions change over
time due to the dynamics (motion) of the computing node and may overlap thereby caus-
ing harm to the physical world. Lack of proper modeling and analysis frameworks for these
systems causes system designers to use ad-hoc techniques thereby further increasing their
design and development time. The thesis addresses these problems by taking a holistic ap-
proach to model Computational, Physical and Cyber Physical Interactions (CPIs) aspects of
a CPS and proposes modeling constructs for them. These constructs are analyzed using
a safety analysis algorithm developed as part of the thesis. The algorithm computes the
intersection of CPIs for both mobile as well as static computing nodes and determines the
safety of the physical system. A framework is developed by extending AADL to support
these modeling constructs; the safety analysis algorithm is implemented as OSATE plug-in.
The applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated by considering the safety of
human tissue during the operations of BAN, and the safety of passengers traveling in an
Autonomous Vehicle.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are system of systems in which computing nodes are em-
bedded in the physical world and perform various task such as monitoring, control, compu-
tation, and communication. These systems have the potential to improve socio economic
standards of living by addressing some of the most significant problems faced by our so-
ciety such as reducing traffic congestion and road accidents, improving health care, green
energy technologies and much more.
Cyber and physical sub systems of a CPS have been studied individually in past
but such a view does not allow system designers to capture the two way interactions, a.k.a
Cyber Physical Interactions (CPIs) that occur between them. As computing systems of the
future become more complex and are deeply embedded in the physical world, a holistic
view is required to properly analyze them. Further, Computing nodes in a CPS can be
either static or mobile. This classification is important because CPIs of mobile computing
nodes have additional characteristics than static computing nodes. For static computing
nodes, there are two types of interactions with the physical world: 1) intended interactions
: interactions that are initiated by computing nodes to accomplish a given task such as
sensing, and communication, 2) unintended interactions : interactions that are not explic-
itly initiated by computing system but are the result of its physical nature and computing
operations, e.g. tissue temperature rise due to heat dissipation by computation of sensors
implanted in human body. Both intended and unintended interactions are spread over re-
gions on the physical world and vary over time. For example, if the computing system has
low power and high power states, then the amount of heat generated is different in both
cases. Unintended interactions are often harmful to the physical world and can be viewed
as side-effects of computing operations. If these interactions are not properly analyzed at
design time they can cause safety hazards to the physical world. In addition, due to prox-
imity of computing nodes unintended interactions can overlap and the resulting side effects
can add up thereby increasing the chances of causing a safety hazard. For example, if
two or more body sensors are placed close to each other, then the temperature rise will be
faster as compared to the situation when there is only one sensor. Safety hazard is defined
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as a situation in which one of the parameters of the physical system changes significantly
and rises above a predefined threshold. In the previous example, if the temperature of the
tissue rises to more than 39.2 ◦C, then there is a high probability of burn injury to the person.
CPSs in which computing nodes have mobility are referred as Mobile CPSs (MCPSs),
e.g. Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). MCPSs in addition to intended and unintended interac-
tions have two additional types of interactions, i) planned interactions: interactions with the
physical world while a computing system is following a pre-planned trajectory. e.g:- an au-
tonomous vehicle traveling along the planned path generated by itŠs navigation system .
ii) unplanned interactions : interactions that result from incorrect operations of computing
nodes, e.g. skidding of an autonomous vehicle along a curved road due to high speed.
If planned or unplanned interactions of two or more mobile computing nodes overlap they
can have detrimental effect on the physical world. For example, collision between two AVs
may cause severe injury to human occupants traveling in them. Unplanned interactions of
an MCPS occur only when certain properties of the computing node go above a threshold.
For example, an AV skids along a curved road if it’s velocity is above a certain threshold
which again depends on the road conditions such as curvature of road and friction.Both un-
planned and planned interactions of a computing node change over time, thus interactions
which did not pose a threat to the physical world at a given point of time may overlap in
future leading to a safety hazard.
1.1 Motivation
Safety of Cyber Physical Systems can be viewed from two perspectives, Operational safety
and Interaction safety. Operational safety is defined as the safety of physical infrastructure
or humans in spite of critical events in the environment. It can be achieved through fault
tolerance mechanism [16], criticality management [35] and several other techniques. In-
teraction safety on the other hand is defined as the safety of the physical world in spite of
unintended or unplanned interactions and is the main focus of this thesis.
To analyze the interaction safety of the physical world it’s essential to model dif-
ferent aspects of CPIs at design time. This modeling can be done in primarily two ways :
i) Formal modeling, and ii) Architectural modeling. Formal modeling is a technique where
system designers use formal methods and techniques such as hybrid automata and reach-
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ability analysis to analyze the safety of the system. This thesis seeks to complement such
verification by facilitating the modeling and analysis from a system architectural perspective,
i.e. allowing for safety analysis (at design time) from representation of system components,
properties, and their inter-dependencies.
Architectural modeling of CPS has focused on modeling different software and
hardware components along with their interactions [19]. Safety verification has also been
considered for reliable, or error-free, operation of the software and hardware components [2].However,
safety vulnerabilities can also be caused by conditions of the physical environment, thus it
is important to capture the inter-dependencies of the cyber (i.e. software and hardware)
components with the physical environment in a holistic manner.
1.2 Objective
The objective of the thesis is to develop modeling abstractions that can capture the
semantics of CPS and a safety analysis algorithm that uses them to the determine
safety of the physical world.
1.3 Challenges
The objective posses several challenges that needs to be addressed and are presented
below:
1. The manifestation of CPIs varies across domains. For example. CPIs of autonomous
vehicles significantly differ from CPIs of BSNs. The modeling abstractions that repre-
sent these CPIs should be generic enough to handle their diverse nature.
2. The safety analysis algorithm should be able to handle the dynamic nature of CPIs
and aggregate side effect of the CPIs on the physical world.
1.4 Contributions
Main contributions of the thesis are summarized below:
1. Modeling abstractions of CPS which capture semantics of intended, unintended,
planned and unplanned interactions between computing and physical systems.
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2. Safety analysis algorithm that computes the intersection of spatial regions represent-
ing CPIs and determines potential harm to the physical world in O(n2), n is the number
of computing nodes.
3. AADL cps annex that implements the modeling constructs as an extension to AADL
language.
4. Two Case Studies demonstrating the application of CPS modeling constructs and
safety verification logic. These are:
a) verifying the safety of human tissue due to heat dissipation of sensors implanted
on human body using cps constructs and safety analysis algorithm.
b) verifying the safety of passengers in an AV using CPS constructs and safety
analysis algorithm.
1.5 Solution Approach
To achieve the above mentioned contributions a model based approach for analyzing the
safety of the physical system is considered. Four modeling abstractions such as Re-
gions of Interest(ROIn), Region of Impact(ROIm), Intended Region of Mobility(IROm), Un-
intended region of mobility (UIROm) are proposed to model CPIs. These constructs have
sub-constructs that describe spatial region of CPIs for static computing nodes as well as
mobility behavior of mobile computing nodes. Physical laws describing the dynamic nature
of CPIs in a CPS, their behavior and side-effect on the physical world are also specified
as a sub-construct. Safety of the physical system can be specified as thresholds on the
physical system parameters. For example, in case of BAN, the temperature of the human
skin should be less than 39.2 ◦C. A safety analysis algorithm is developed that computes
spatial regions of CPIs, their intersection and uses equations specified as physical laws to
determine if the safety condition of the physical system is violated or not.
Modeling abstractions are implemented as an annex by extending AADL [2], an
industry standard language used for modeling embedded systems. To integrate with the
AADL framework annex grammar, parser and semantic checker are developed .
Two case studies are being considered to show the applicability of the proposed
constructs and safety analysis algorithm:
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1. In the first case study, thermal side effects of communication of a network of body
sensors and computation of a single pulse oximeter on the human tissue is consid-
ered. Thermal side effects are modeled by ROIms construct. The safety analysis
algorithm first computes the temperature rise in each individual ROIm to determine
the safety of the tissue. It then computes the intersection of multiple ROIms and to
determine the aggregate side effect.
2. In the second case study, safety of passengers traveling in a pickup truck (AV) on Mile
Post 44, Arizona 83 highway is determined. The identified road segment is a hori-
zontal curve and the AV can potentially skid and collide with the guard rail. A recent
report [14] published by National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)
identifies that the average crash rate along horizontal curves is three times more than
any other horizontal road segment. The safety analysis algorithm computes the prob-
ability of serious injury to passengers using safety verification algorithm. The same
metric is computed based on the number of accidents and other factors identified in
the AZ-83 assessment report [41]. Comparison of the safety verification results with
the results based on the AZ-83 assessment report shows an error in serious injury
probability to be around 0.001.
5
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, the thesis is compared with other relevant works from the literature. The
related work is categorized into following areas:
2.1 Model Based Analysis of Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are often considered as the precursors of Cyber Physical Systems,
since they have a computation aspect and interact with the physical world by means of sen-
sors and actuators. Researchers have proposed different modeling tools such as AADL [2],
Simulink [11], MARTE [13] and techniques [34] [20] [38] to analyze the safety of embedded
systems systems. None of these tools support constructs to model Cyber physical Interac-
tions. Model transformation is another commonly used technique to convert models from
one modeling language to another, so that it’s easily to analyze or there is a good tool sup-
port. In [20] authors propose a model transformation technique to verify the active safety
systems of automobiles. The technique converts automobile design model specified using
EAST-ADL2 to HIP-HoPS, a safety analysis tool. EAST-ADL2 constructs model physical
world to a certain extent but they are specific to automobile domain and cannot be used to
model generic CPIs. In [38] a dependability modeling framework that uses AADL Error An-
nex to model the error states and the fault-tolerance mechanism of a system is proposed.
The framework can be used to analyze the propagation of errors between different sub-
systems thereby determining if the system is safe or not. Authors in [36] propose ANDES,
a tool that uses Model based analysis techniques to analyze low latency and accuracy of
Wireless Sensor Network operations. Both the above works, do not model physical world
and the CPIs. In [44] authors develop a dynamic risk assessment strategy to assure the
safety of autonomous vehicles. The strategy allows controller of an autonomous vehicle
to assess the risk associate with each possible control action at a given point of time and
determine the safest action to carry. The work was intended towards designing safe con-
trollers, however the present thesis can be used on evaluating whether a given controller is
safe by determining if it’s control outputs cause harm to the physical world, as demonstrated
in the case study involving autonomous vehicles.
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2.2 Model Based Development of Cyber Physical Systems
Some of the tools mentioned in the previous section can be used to model computing
components of a CPS. To model the physical world tools such as Modelica [7], Fluent [4]
and Sysml [12] can be used. . In [39] authors propose architectural patterns for CPS
development that can be formally verified. The focus of the work was on building formally
verifiable components. This thesis is focused on verifying if the system in safe or unsafe.
2.3 Architecture modeling of Cyber Physical Systems
Architecture modeling of Cyber Physical Systems have been done by researchers in [37]
and [31]. Their main contribution was on modeling intended cyber physical interactions
such as sensing and actuation. For example, in [37] authors propose P2C and C2P con-
nectors between cyber and physical subsystems of a Cyber Physical System. This the-
sis considers intended and unintended interactions of static computing nodes as well as
planned and unplanned interactions of mobile computing nodes. In [8] authors perform a
formal analysis of a system’s architecture model (specified using AADL) by specifying the
behavior of the system using Algebra of Communicating shared resources [8]. But, the au-
thors don’t provide any abstractions for modeling interactions between cyber and physical
sub-systems of a CPS. This work on the other hand doesn’t provide constructs for formally
specifying the system behavior but provides abstractions for modeling cyber physical inter-
actions.
2.4 Hybrid Automata and Formal Verification
Hybrid automata and formal verification techniques have been used by researchers in [29]
to ensure the safety of autonomous robots. In a hybrid automata, certain states are desig-
nated as unsafe and reachability to these states are analyzed for safety verification. Authors
in [15] use formal verification techniques to guarantee the safety of Autonomous Vehicles
under sensor uncertainties or other disturbances. The safety criteria considered in that work
also does not take into account the probability on passenger injury. This paper is compli-
mentary to such verification that allows modeling abstractions from the system architectural
perspective, provides specific constructs for semantically different planned and unplanned
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interactions, and enables passenger safety verification for complex scenarios at the design
time.
2.5 Operational Safety of Cyber Physical Systems
Operational safety for CPS has been considered by authors in [35]. The paper presents a
framework for modeling the critical states and critical events in the system. Different metrics
are proposed that evaluate the effectiveness of mitigative actions so that system can return
to normal state. The framework can be modeled using existing AADL constructs however
the interaction safety which requires modeling the CPIs can not be modeled.
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Chapter 3
Cyber Physical Systems: Components and Properties
Cyber Physical Systems consists of three components or subsystems, these are: network
of (or single) computing nodes, physical world or physical system, and cyber physical inter-
actions.
3.1 Components of Cyber Physical Systems
The above mentioned components can have several properties and behaviors associated
with them which are described below.
Computing Systems
Systems that have a computing, sensing, control, navigation and communication aspects
associated with them are called computing systems. These systems can have following sub
components :
• Sensing subsystem: Sensing subsystem of a computing system consists of a variety
of sensors that sense the physical environment around it. These sensors often have
a limited sensing range which might not be uniform in all directions [28]. For example,
LIDAR used in autonomous vehicles [42]to detect nearby obstacles do not have a
uniform pulse energy distribution [5].
• Communication subsystem: Communication subsystem of a computing system
consists of radios for transmitting and receiving data from other computing nodes.
Similar to sensing range, communication range might not be uniform across all direc-
tions. For example, radios used for communication between wireless sensor networks
often have a disk shaped communication range [47].
• Control subsystem: Actuation subsystem of a computing system is responsible for
controlling the physical system by generating appropriate control outputs. Control
outputs are determined based on the information sensed by the sensing subsystem
and the control logic inside the controller subsystem. For example, control system of
an autonomous vehicle is responsible for generating speed and steering commands
so that the vehicle stays on a predefined course/path.
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• Navigation subsystem: For mobile computing nodes navigation sub system is an-
other major component. This sub system is responsible for generating way-points or
path along which the computing node will move. For example, in an autonomous ve-
hicle navigation sub system generates a trajectory based on the destination location
provided by user and it’s current location.
Properties of Computing Systems
Computing systems can have three types of properties associated with them:
• Computing Properties : Properties of a computing system that affect it’s computing,
sensing, actuation and navigation sub system are defined as computing properties.
For example, sampling time of sensors, priorities of threads running on a computing
node, sleep and active states of a sensor etc. .
• Physical Properties: Properties of a computing system that are result of it’s phys-
ical nature are defined as physical properties of a computing node. For example,
mass and length of an autonomous vehicle, power dissipation of sensors deployed
on human body etc. These properties often depend on the computing behavior of the
system and can cause un-intentional interactions with the physical world.
• Mobility Properties: Properties of a computing system that characterize it’s motion
are defined as mobility properties. For example, velocity and direction of motion of an
AV .
Physical Systems
Computing system are often embedded in the physical world with which it interacts. Similar
to computing systems, physical systems have certain properties or behaviors associated
with them. These are given below :
• Physical Properties: Properties of the physical system are defined as physical prop-
erties. For example, Blood perfusion rate of human tissues, radius of curvature and
coefficient of friction of a road on which an autonomous vehicle travels .
• Physical Laws: In addition to the physical properties various physical laws are of-
ten associated with the physical world. These laws determine the change of physical
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properties over time and sometimes over space. For example, heat equation deter-
mine the variation of temperature in a given region over time [21].
Physical properties and physical laws together determine the behavior of the physical sys-
tem and resulting cyber phsyical interactions.
Cyber Physical Interactions
Cyber Physical Interactions(CPIs) in a CPS characterize the energy interactions (i.e. un-
intended interactions) as well as system defined interactions between computing-physical
systems and computing-computing systems. CPIs for static computing nodes are different
from mobile computing nodes and are described below.
Static Computing Nodes
For static computing nodes two types of CPIs exist, intended interactions and unintended
interactions.
• Intended Interactions:Interactions that are system initiated and are essential for the
functioning of CPS are called intended interactions. These interactions can be be-
tween two computing nodes or between a computing node and physical world. For
example, communication between two sensors of a BAN, monitoring heart rate by
EKG signals etc. Sensing and control sub-systems of a computing system cause
intended interactions with the physical world. These two sub-systems are also con-
nected using analog-digital and digital-analog converters. Sampling time and quanti-
zation parameters of these converters also effect the intended interactions. For exam-
ple, if sampling time of LIDAR sensors [5] is high then the autonomous vehicle might
not detect nearby obstacles and will fail to generate collision avoidance maneuvers
leading to collisions.
• Unintended Interactions: Interactions due to operation of computing systems that
have undesirable side effects on the physical world are called unintended interactions.
These interactions represent transfer of energy between computing and physical sys-
tems and have a region associated with them. For example, heat dissipation from
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sensor nodes can cause undesirable temperature rise of human tissue where it is de-
ployed. In addition to space, these interactions also vary with time. For example, heat
dissipation of computing node depends on it’s current state. Unintended interactions
are harmful to the physical world and may result in safety hazards.
• Aggregate Effect: The overlapping of unintended interactions (i.e spatial regions) of
two or more computing nodes can cause the side effects to the physical world. These
side effects can add up thereby increasing the chances of occurrence of a safety
hazard. For example, the heat dissipation of two sensors can add up and cause
more burn injuries than due to a single sensor .
Mobile Computing nodes
Due to mobility of computing nodes in a CPS, they exhibit two more types of interactions:
planned interactions and unplanned interactions.
• Planned Interactions:Interactions that are caused by computing system while follow-
ing a pre-planned trajectory are known as planned interactions. These interactions
depend on the position, computing and physical behavior of a computing node, and
can have more than one physical law (e.g., Newtons equations of motion, laws of
thermodynamics etc ) associated with them. E.g. Motion of an AV along the planned
trajectory.
• Unplanned Interactions:Interactions that result from faulty operations of the comput-
ing system are called unplanned interactions. These interactions define the physical
behavior of computing system during faulty operations. Unplanned interactions oc-
cur when the magnitude of certain physical properties of a computing system are
above a minimum threshold. Due to the close coupling with the physical world, the
threshold also depends on properties of the physical system. For example, skid of an
autonomous vehicle along a curve is an unplanned interaction, it will only occur if the
velocity of autonomous vehicle is above a certain threshold. This threshold depends
on the curvature of road. Similar to planned interactions, unplanned interactions can
have more than one physical law associated with them and vary with the position of a
computing system. Both planned and unplanned interactions manifest as regions on
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in the physical world which change with time. For example, in case of AVs the spatial
regions indicate the position of AV during planned and unplanned interaction.
3.2 Examples of Cyber Physical Systems
In this sub section two examples of cyber physical systems are presented showing the
above mentioned properties
Cyber Physical Perspective of BSN
Body Sensor Network(BAN) are network of sensors implanted or worn on human body to
monitor the physiological state (as shown in Fig 3.1). These sensors can run different tasks
such as EKG based security algorithm [43], control algorithm for regulating mean arterial
blood pressure [33] etc. In addition, sensors form either single hop or multi-hop networks
to transmit the sensed data to a base station. The sensing and communication tasks in a
BSN often produce heat due to which the surrounding tissue temperature rises [40]. If the
temperature is not controlled, it can lead to burn injuries. Various components of a BSN
(i.e sensors, medical devices etc) along with their operations can be viewed from a CPS
perspective.
The sensors in BSN form the computing system, the human body whose state is
being monitored forms the physical system. Sensing, communication and control tasks car-
ried by sensors to ensure proper operations of BAN are the intended interactions whereas
the heat dissipation of sensors and the resulting temperature rise will be the unintended
interaction. Fig 3.1 illustrates these views.
Cyber Physical Perspective of Autonomous Vehicles
The architecture of an Autonomous vehicles(AVs) and their operations can be viewed from
the perspective of Mobile Cyber Physical Systems (MCPS) and are shown in Fig 3.2. Sens-
ing, navigation and control sub systems govern the decision making of an autonomous ve-
hicle and have a computing nature, thus they can be represented as a computing (cyber)
system. Physical environment around an autonomous vehicles such as road conditions,
obstacles and it’s own vehicle dynamics form a physical system. The interaction between
these two systems cause an autonomous to move and thus can be modeled as CPIs . Two
types of CPIs exist : i) The trajectory generated by navigation subsystem of an AV cor-
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Wearable Sensor Nodes
Communication Range
Intended interaction
Operational view Logical view Cyber Physical view
Unintended interaction
Figure 3.1: Cyber Physical System’s Perspective of Body Sensor Networks
responds to planned interaction because the motion of autonomous vehicle is preplanned
and is intentional from it’s perspective. Whereas, ii) The path traveled by an autonomous
vehicle during a skid is due to it’s improper operations (e.g. incorrect velocity control output)
and is not preplanned, thus it can be represented as unplanned interaction. In addition, the
interaction between computing sub-system and vehicle dynamics of an AV which occurs by
means of sensors, actuators, D/A, A/D are considered as CPIs. CPS perspective of AV is
shown in Figure 3.2.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Cyber Physical Systems
In this chapter, first the modeling requirements for CPS are presented and then based on
them corresponding modeling abstractions are presented. The modeling abstractions are
domain independent and can be used to model different aspects of CPS such as intentional,
unintentional, planned and unplanned interactions.
4.1 Modeling Requirements of CPS
CPS modeling requirements are based on the characteristics and properties specified in
the previous chapter. A modeling framework should support:
• Modeling of computing system’s individual sub systems, their computing and physical
properties 3.1.
• Modeling of computing system’s motion characteristics under planned and unplanned
interactions. 3.1
• Modeling of physical system’s properties and physical laws 3.1 that affect CPIs.
• A CPS can have large number of computing nodes, each with their own set of prop-
erties and CPIs with the physical system. Thus modeling of a computing unit and it’s
local CPI should be supported in the framework.
• Modeling of regions in physical world denoting the extent of CPIs 3.1,3.1.
• Modeling of side effects on the physical world due to CPIs 3.1.
• Modeling of control logic that generate planned motion and control unplanned motion.
3.1
• Modeling safety thresholds of the physical system 3.1.
4.2 Modeling Abstractions of CPS
In this section, generic modeling abstractions of CPS are presented. These constructs are
shown pictorially in figure4.1
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Modeling Computing System
Each computing node is modeled as Computing unit construct. This construct can repre-
sent a computing, sensing or actuation system and translates to modeling requirement . It
facilitates the specification of computing, physical, and mobility properties of a computing
node using following sub constructs. First, Computing Property: The construct character-
izes the computing property of a computing node. A computing property can have units
and data types associated with it. Second, Physical Property: This property characterizes
the physical behavior of a computing node.
Modeling Physical System
Physical unit : A physical unit construct is used to abstractly represent a physical system.
It translates to requirement 4.1. To denote physical system’s properties and associated
dynamics following sub constructs are developed. First, Physical Property: The construct
characterizes the properties of the physical system. Similar to computing system’s proper-
ties, a physical property can have units and data types associated with it. Second, Physical
Process: This construct is used to model physical laws governing a physical system. Alge-
braic and differential equations representing a physical law can be specified here.
Modeling Cyber Physical Interactions
CPIs of a computing node is modeled using following constructs. First, Region Of Inter-
est(ROIn):This construct facilitates the modeling of the intentional interactions in a CPS. It
has two sub-constructs, Monitored Parameters: This construct models the system parame-
ters that are affected by the intentional interactions. Monitored parameters are the subsets
of physical properties of either physical system or computing system. Region Boundary:
This construct represents the limits of the bounded region within which the intentional in-
teractions are confined. The region boundary depends on the variation of the monitored
parameters. Region Of Impact(ROIm):This construct facilitates the modeling of the unin-
tended interaction and the side effects on the physical world in a CPS. It addresses require-
ment . It has two sub-constructs, first Impacted Parameters: This construct models the
physical system’s parameters that are affected by the unintentional interactions. Impacted
Parameters are the subsets of physical system properties. Second, Physical Process: This
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construct is used to model side effects which are generally represented as physical laws.
Region Boundary:This construct is similar to region boundary in RegionOfInterest. How-
ever, region boundary of ROIm depends on the physical properties and dynamics. Since
the physical dynamics are governed by differential equations, the region boundary can be
specified by boundary conditions on the equations. These conditions are generally limits
on the physical properties outside the ROIm. For example, in case of temperature rise in
human body, we can assume that the body temperature is 39.2 ◦C outside the ROIm. We
can then employ this boundary condition to the associated differential equation to obtain
region boundary. Unintended Region of Mobility (UIROm) Spatial regions of the physical
world in which unplanned interactions of a computing system occur over a given period of
time is modeled by UIROm construct. UIROm at a particular time instant gives the region
in physical space that is occupied by a computing node because of it’s physical charac-
teristics. This construct addresses requirement 4.1. A UIROm can be characterized from
Physical Process and Computing Mobility sub-constructs.Impacted Parameters: Impacted
parameter are same as defined in case of Region of Impact. Physical Process: The
behavior of a computing system during an unplanned interaction is modeled using this con-
struct. This behavior can be defined in terms of either the control system’s logic during an
unplanned interaction or by a physical law. For example, during an skid situation if the au-
tonomous vehicle is equipped with a traction control system, it will automatically detect the
skid and try to bring the vehicle back on road. The traction control system can be modeled
using this construct. This construct also describes how impacted parameters change over
time.Computing Mobility: This construct is used to describes the initial position of a com-
puting node and associated motion equations that completely capture the mobile behavior
of a computing node during an unintended interaction4.1. For example, if the motion equa-
tions of a autonomous vehicle are different due to the working of traction control system,
then it can be described using this construct. Minimum Threshold : This construct is used to
model the condition that for unplanned interactions to occur, impacting parameters should
be greater than a specific threshold. Intended Region of Mobility (IROm): Spatial extent of
the physical world in which planned interaction of a computing system occur over a given
period of time is modeled by IROm construct. Similar to UIROm, IROm can be character-
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ized from Physical Process and Computing Mobility constructs. However, the difference
being that in Physical Process we can define the controller’s logic of keeping the vehicle in
intended region of mobility (i.e. along the planned paths) and in computing mobility we can
define the motion dynamics of computing system during planned interaction. This construct
addresses requirement 4.1.
Modeling Cyber Physical System
All the previous constructs are used to model different components of a CPS. However to
model multiple computing systems in a CPS and the fact that each each computing node
has it’s own CPI, additional constructs are needed which are described further. LCPS:
A computing node and it’s individual CPI are modeled using LCPS (Local Cyber Physical
System) construct. Each LCPS has a computing unit and can have Region of Interest,
Region of Impact, Intended Region of Mobility and Unintended region of mobility as sub
constructs. GCPS: Multiple LCPSs in CPS form a GCPS (Global Cyber physical system ),
this construct has multiple LCPS’s as it’s sub constructs. Safety Threshold This construct
allows system designers to specify limits on impacted parameters beyond which the system
is declared to be unsafe. Aggregate Effect : In a CPS, interactions can also occur between
two or more LCPS’s. The interactions usually occurs when either ROIn’s or ROIm’s of
LCPS’s overlap. For example, the cumulative thermal effect of computing nodes (in a BSN
) on a particular area of physical environment (overlapping of ROIMs) can be modeled using
this construct.
Analysis governing parameters
In addition to the above mentioned constructs that are based on MCPS characteristics,
few more constructs are defined that govern complexity and accuracy of safety verification
logic. Time Duration: Time duration (tduration), is the duration for which the system will be
analyzed in the safety verification logic. During this period, if the safety verification logic
detects any safety hazard which can lead to violation of safety threshold, the system will
be declared as unsafe. Sampling Time: Sampling time is a parameter used in the safety
verification logic to repeatedly compute computing systems position, impacting, impacted
parameters, UIROm, IROm and their intersections. Sampling time affects both complex-
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Figure 4.1: CPS constructs
ity of safety verification logic and accuracy of analysis results as explained in Chapter 5.
Discretization:This construct allows system designers to provide differential equation solver
parameters such as initial condition, boundary value conditions and discretization values.
The solver configuration will be used if the CPS model contains a physical processes that
are specified in terms of differential equations.
4.3 CPS Annex: A Modeling Framework for Cyber Physical Systems
CPS modeling constructs described in the previous subsection are implemented by extend-
ing the AADL language.
Introduction to AADL
AADL [2] is an industry standard language for modeling the architecture of Embedded Real
Time Systems. The language provides several abstractions specific to embedded system
thereby allowing designers to model the system in a iterative manner, as a result, they
can verify that the design meets the requirements at every stage. Another benefit of using
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Figure 4.2: AADL Modeling and Analysis Work-flow
AADL lies in extensibility. The core language can be easily extended to model system’s fault
tolerance, error handling and several other behaviors. The extensions are often referred
as annexes in AADL terminology. Custom Plug-ins can be developed to analyze AADL
models using OSATE framework [2]. OSATE framework provides several libraries that can
parse AADL models, gather information(model details) and pass it to analysis plug-ins. If
the AADL models contain user defined annexes, then the system designers should also
provide libraries that can parse annexes when invoked by OSATE framework. Figure 4.2
shows the various stages involved during the modeling and analysis of AADL models.
Limitations of AADL
AADL core language does not support the specification of physical systems and cyber
physical interactions. In particular physical dynamics which are generally represented by
algebraic and differential equations are not supported in AADL. In addition, the cps model-
ing abstractions developed in previous subsections cannot be semantically represented by
any of the existing components. Thus, to model Cyber Physical Systems in AADL, the core
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Expression := SubExpression { (+ |-) SubExpression }
SubExpession:=Term { (* | /)Term}
Term:= Derivative Expression | Port Identifier |AADL  Property |
DataAccessIndetifier.subcomponentidentifier
DerivativeExpression :==  Del<DerivativeOrder><DepdentVariable><IndependentVariable>
|Pdel <DerivativeOrder><DependentVariable>
(<IndependentVariable>) +
Figure 4.3: Algebraic and Differential Equation’s grammar
PhysicallProcess := 
(Initalization)(0-1) (Boundary Conditions)(0-1)
Expression+
Initalization := 
Expression+
Boundary Conditions:= 
Expression+
Figure 4.4: Physical Process Construct
language should be extended with cpsannex.
CPS Annex for modeling CPS
In this section, cps annex grammar and cps annex library are presented. As shown in figure
4.2, cps annex library is integrated with OSATE framework so that it will be automatically
invoked as and when an annex construct is encountered. Specifying algebraic and differ-
ential equations: Differential and algebraic equations are essential to model dynamics of
the physical world, mobile behavior of computing nodes, side effects on the physical world
due to cyber physical interactions etc. It is specified using grammar defined in Figure .
where Del is used to denote a derivative and Pdel to denote a partial derivative.
Expression rule denotes a single algebraic statement.
Specifying dynamics of the physical world and contol logic of computing system:
Physical Process construct is being developed to capture the dynamics of the physical world
and unintended interactions of computing system (as shown in Figure 4.5). The construct
is built on top of Expression construct and multiple expressions can be specified within it.
In addition, there are Initialization and Boundary Condition constructs that can be used to
initialize various parameters and specify boundary conditions for differential equations. At
present only Dirichlet boundary conditions can be specified.
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Intended Region of Mobility := {
( Physical Process)
(Computing mobility)
}
Computing Mobility :={
Expression+
} Figure 4.5: Intended Region of Mobility
Unintended Region of Mobility := {
( Physical Process)
(Computing mobility)
(MinimumThreshold)
}
Computing Mobility :={
Expression+
}
MinimumThreshold {
Expression
}
Figure 4.6: UnIntended Region of Mobility Grammer
Specifying Cyber Physical Interactions: There can be four different types of CPIs
as stated in the previous subsection, these are intended region of mobility, unintended
region of mobility, region of impact and region of interest. Corresponding to them, four
different constructs are developed IntendedRegionOfMobility, UnIntendedRegionOfMobil-
ity, RegionOfImpact and RegionOfInterest. IntendedRegionOfMobility: The construct is
used to model the planned paths as well as the control logic of a computing node. It has
two main sub constructs as shown in Figure 4.5, PhysicalProcess and ComputingMobil-
ity. Physical Process is described previously, ComputingMobility models motion equations.
Motion equations consists of a set of algebraic or differential equations.
UnIntendedRegionOfMobility: The construct is used to model erroneous paths of a
computing node. Similar to IntendedRegionOfMobility this construct has Physical Process
and ComputingMobility as sub constructs. In addition, it has MinimumThreshold construct,
which models the condition for erroneous interaction to occur. MinimumThreshold construct
can have an algebraic conditions within it. UnIntendedRegionOfMobility construct is shown
in Figure 4.6.
RegionOfImpact : The RegionOfImpact construct models the harmful side effects of
23
RegionOfImpact:= 
(Physical Process)
(Region Boundary)
RegionBoundary:= 
(Length = Number ; Width = Number)|
(IDENT CONDITIONOP NUMBER) |
(Expression)
Figure 4.7: Region of Impact Grammar
the computing node on the physical world. It has two main sub-constructs PhysicalProcess
and Region Boundary. As stated in previous section ,PhysicalProcess can be used to
model the equations that are associated with the side effect. Region Boundary on the other
hand is used to specify the extent( spatial boundary) upto which the physical system will be
effected. The boundary can be specified in three ways: 1) Specifying the length and width
of the region, this can be used if region is a rectangle. 2) Specifying thresholds on one of
the parameters (e.g. section of the human tissue where the temperature is above 37.0 ◦C),
this can be used if the region is irregular 3) If the region corresponds to a geometric object,
e.g., circle, then they can specify the perimeter equation of this object. The grammar for
this construct is shown in Figure 4.7.
RegionOfInterest : The RegionOfInterest construct has two sub-constructs Physi-
calProcess and RegionBoundary. These two constructs are already explained.
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Chapter 5
Safety Analysis Algorithm for Cyber Physical Systems
In this section an algorithm is presented for modeling the safety of Cyber Physical Systems.
The algorithm uses the modeling constructs presented in chapter 4.
5.1 Algorithm Description
The safety analysis algorithm for determining the safety of the physical system in a CPS can
be broken down into two parts : i) analyzing interactions due to mobile nature of computing
nodes, Algorithm 1 and ii)analyzing energy interactions, Algorithm 2.
Analyzing interactions due to mobility of computing nodes
The objective of safety verification logic is to determine if two or more planned or unplanned
interactions in a CPS intersect, and then compute the value of impacted parameter to deter-
mine if the safety threshold is violated. Possible safety hazards are analyzed by checking
three conditions : 1) intersection of IROm with another IROm: this hazard analysis checks
if planned interactions of two or more computing units overlap, even though intended in-
teractions are explicitly initiated by computing nodes it is still possible for safety criteria to
get violated. ii) Intersection between UIROm and IROm : this hazard analysis checks if
planned interaction of one computing node intersects with unplanned interaction of another
computing node. iii) Intersection between UIROm/IROm and physical object : this hazard
analysis checks if unplanned interactions of two or more computing nodes or a computing
node and a physical object overlap, leading to a potentially dangerous situation.
Inputs and Outputs of the algorithm
The algorithm takes as input a CPS model specified using the above mentioned constructs
and outputs whether the system is safe or unsafe.
Algorithm Description
Safety verification algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm begins with detecting
unintended interactions and sets up ctime (current time, in Step 2) equal to zero, a variable
that denotes the time instant at which we are evaluating values of impacting, impacted and
IROm parameters (Step 4). After this, the algorithm determines if any planned or unplanned
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interactions exist in CPS by checking the value of any impacting parameter is less than
minimum threshold (Steps 5-7), if the condition succeeds then there are no unplanned
interactions in the system and we have to check for overlap of any intended interactions
(Step 22) . On the other hand, if unplanned interactions exist, then we compute the value
of UIROm (using equations specified in physical process and mobility constructs) for each
computing node(Step 8) and check it’s intersection with UIROm (Steps 10-14) ) and IROm
(Step 16-21 ) of other computing nodes. During these step once an overlapping region is
detected the algorithm computes the value of impacted parameter (Steps 12,18 and 24) to
check if it’s value goes above the threshold value (safety criteria). If the threshold is not
violated we increments ctime by sampling time and proceed to next iteration (Step 31 ).
Algorithm Termination Criteria
The algorithm terminates under the following situations :
• Value of an impacted parameter goes above the safety threshold leading to an unsafe
situation.
• Value of current time exceeds time duration. This condition indicates that the value of
impacted parameters did not rise above the safety threshold and the system is safe.
Algorithm Complexity
The complexity of the algorithm depends on the sampling time(tsampling) and number of
computing nodes, n. Assuming it takes a constant time to compute intersection of UIROm
and IROm regions (Step 16) of two computing nodes, it will take O(n2) steps to compute
the same intersection for all n nodes. Since we are also checking intersection of IROm
and IRom (Step 22), UIRom and UIRom (Step10) it will take O(2*n2) more steps in each
iteration. Thus, the total number of steps in each iteration are O(3*n2). We repeat the
iteration tduration/ tsampling times (Steps 3-32). Hence, the total complexity of the algorithm
will be O(tduration*n2/ tsampling).
If we increase tsampling time to reduce the complexity, we are less frequently
computing the values of impacting, impacted, IROm(ctime) and UIROm(ctime), this may
cause the algorithm to miss detection of any overlapping regions, leading to incorrect re-
sults. Thus, there exists a trade-off between complexity and accuracy in the safety
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verification logic. It is up-to system designers discretion to choose an appropriate value
of tsampling.
Analyzing Energy Interactions
Algorithm 2 analyzes the energy interactions of the system. The algorithm begins by check-
ing the value of physical system parameters (impacted parameters) that are affected by
side effects due to unintended interactions. Since unintended interactions are modeled us-
ing ROIm construct and physical process sub-construct, the value of impacted parameters
are computed using those two constructs. If the physical processes in the model contain
differential equations, they can be numerically solved using analysis parameters that are
specified in the CPS model. In the next step, the intersection of ROIm’s of multiple LCPSs
is checked, if they intersect the value of impacted parameter in these regions is recomputed
using additive effect construct. This step essentially analyzes the aggregate side effect of
to multiple computing nodes on a particular region of the physical environment. Assuming
it takes O(k) to evaluate the physical process, the complexity of this part of the algorithm
will be O(n2*k).
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm: Safety Verification Logic Using CPS Constructs
Set ctime = 0
while ctime ≤ tduration do
For all computing nodes compute impacting
parameters of each computing node using equa-
tions equations specified in physical process con-
struct of IROm
if impacting parameters≤Minimum threshold
then
Goto Line 27
else
Compute UIROm(ctime)
end if
if UIROm(ctime) of two or more computing
nodes intersect then
Compute the value of impacted parame-
ters
if impacted parameters ≥ any safety
threshold then
Declare system as unsafe,return
end if
if IROm(ctime) of one computing nodes in-
tersects with UIROm(ctime) of other computing
nodes then
Compute the value of impacted param-
eters
if impacted parameters violate any
safety threshold then
Declare System as unsafe, return
end if
end if
end if
end while
if UIROm(ctime) of a computing node intersects
with a Physical Object then
Compute the value of impacted parameters
if impacted parameters violate any safety
threshold then
Declare System as unsafe, return
end if
end if
if IROm(ctime) of two or more computing nodes
intersect then
Compute the value of impacted parameters
if impacted parameters violate any safety
threshold then
Declare System as unsafe, return
end if
end if
if ctime == tduration then
Declare system as safe, return
end if
increment ctime by tsampling
Algorithm 2 Algorithm: Safety Verification Logic Using CPS Constructs, analyzing energy
interactions
1: Compute the value of impacted parameter within each LCPS in the ROIm using equations provided in
Physical Process and analysis parameters
2: if impacted parameters violate any safety threshold then
3: Declare System as unsafe, return
4: end if
5: if ROIm of two or more computing nodes intersect then
6: Recompute value of impacted parameters in the intersected region using aggregate relation
7: if impacted parameters violate any safety threshold then
8: Declare System as unsafe, return
9: end if
10: end if
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Chapter 6
Application of CPS Modeling Constructs and Safety Analysis Algorithm
In this chapter, two case studies are presented that uses CPS modeling constructs and
safety analysis algorithm to verify the safety of the physical system. These case studies are
: i) evaluating thermal safety of BSN, and ii) evaluating safety of passengers traveling in an
Autonomous Vehicle that collides with a guard while negotiating a curve.
6.1 Evaluating Thermal Safety of BSN
In this section we consider the safety of human body under two different operations of BAN
- computation and communication.
Scenario Description
To determine the effect of computation on human tissue we will consider a TelosB mote
interfaced with finger tip Pulse Oximeter sensor. The pulse oximeter probe is always in
contact with the tissue, during it’s operation it passes light at a particular frequency. The
energy transfer from pulse oximeter probe to the finger skin is the major source of thermal
energy in the system. To derive physiological values from sensed light intensity, the senor
node performs computation which results in generation of heat. Here it is assumed that
there is no other pulse oximeter node in proximity with the sensor node. the computation
workload on sensor node is assumed to be constant over the period of operation of the
sensor node.
To consider the effect of a communication on human tissue, we consider a multi-hop
wireless communication network on sensor nodes implanted in human body. The sensor
nodes consists of a low capability computing entity , radio and sensor interfaced to it. Due
to communication work load sensor nodes dissipate heat which rises the temperature of
the human tissue, it is further assumed that the senor nodes are placed close to each other
so that the heat dissipation of two or more sensor node adds up thereby increasing the
average temperature of human tissue. The multi-hop communication protocol considered
in this section is cluster based [23]. In this protocol from the set of worker nodes few leader
nodes are selected by the base station. Each non leader worker node has to select a leader
node as it’s parent to forward the sensed information. The worker nodes select a leader by
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listening to the beacon messages generated by various leader nodes and the selecting the
one with high signal to noise ratio. The leader node along with worker nodes that select it as
it’s parent form a cluster, with the leader being the cluster head. Worker nodes forward the
information to cluster heads, which forward the same to the base station. In [40] authors
show that the high workload on cluster head can significantly increase the temperature
of the human skin. The temperature rise is mainly due to absorption of electromagnetic
radiation from the antenna head during cluster head communication with the base station.
The authors also propose a thermal aware algorithm for periodically rotating the cluster
head to reduce the temperature rise.
Analysis Methodology
ISO 60601 standard for Medical Electrical Equipment defines safety of a health system on
human body, as avoidance of unacceptable risks during it’s normal or faulty operations.
The standard lists several safety categories of which one of the most important is thermal
safety. Thermal safety is characterized by a threshold temperature such that if a device
exceeds this temperature during it’s operation then the physical environment incurs ther-
mal damage. During thermal safety analysis the temperature of the physical environment
of a device is monitored during several stages of it’s operation and checked against ther-
mal safety threshold. The principle of hazard based safety engineering is often employed
for thermal safety analysis of a health system as suggested by [45]. Hazard based safety
analysis techniques requires following steps for analyzing thermal safety of BAN. Charac-
terization of energy source: The principal energy sources are the Computing Units in
the model whose Physical Properties characterize the energy sources. They can be of two
types - 1) constant temperature source (a heat source that supplies energy at a constant
temperature) and 2) constant power source (a heat source that supplies energy at a con-
stant power). Thermal safety standards often limit the maximum temperature reached by
constant temperature sources.
Thermal characterization of physical environment: The Physical unit in case of
a BAN is primarily the human body and is modeled as a mass that absorbs heat. The Re-
gion Of Impact is defined on the physical unit and the Physical properties of it characterize
its thermal behavior in terms of a thermal damage parameter. Thermal damage parameter
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is estimated based on an Arrhenius model of temperature rise of the physical unit with re-
spect to duration of exposure to heat source as suggested by by Moritz and Henrique [24].
A threshold temperature can be calculated such that if the temperature of the physical unit
exceeds this threshold then thermal damage is sure to occur. The threshold temperature
Tthresh is given by
Tthresh =
Ea
R[ln(τ)−R.ln( 1
A
)]
, (6.1)
Heat transfer process: The heat transfer process controls the manner in which the
temperature rise of the physical unit occurs. Heat transfer is due to thermal conductance
and thermal radiation from heat sources and convective cooling. The thermal conductance
from heat source to physical unit can be given by,
H = K 52 T, (6.2)
where, H is the amount of heat added to the system from heat source, K is the
thermal conductivity of the physical unit and 52T gives the distribution of temperature in
the monitored area. Thermal radiation can be accounted for using Stefan’s law for hot body
radiation where constant temperature sources are considered to calculate the heat input to
the system as follows:
H = S × σ(T 4r − T 4a ), (6.3)
where S is the Surface area of the hot body, σ is the emissivity, Tr is the surface temperature
of hot body and Ta is the ambient temperature. Convective heat transfer can be modeled
using a linear model H = -b(T-Tb) where b is constant coefficient and Tb is temperature of
convective fluid in the physical system (for example blood). The negative sign indicates
that it has a cooling effect to the system. Heat transfer due to electromagnetic radiation is
modeled in terms of the Specific Absorption Rate (SAR). The SAR value is dependent on
the characteristics of the antennae in the electromagnetic energy source and is evaluated
based on the methodology suggested by [40].
Modeling thermal side-effects of BSN computation using CPS constructs
In this subsection, the thermal side effect of pulse oximeter on the human tissue is mod-
eled using CPS constructs presented in Chapter 4. The pulse oximeter is modeled as a
computing system. Computing properties of a pulse oximeter such as current drawn (which
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Declaration GlobalCPS
end GlobCPS;
Implementation GlobalCPS.BSN
subcomponents
LocalCPS. PulseOx
Declaration LocalCPS
end LocalCPS;
Implementation LocalCPS. PulseOx
subcomponets
ComputingNode. PulseSensor
End LocalCPS. PulseOx
Declaration ComputingNode
end ComputingNode;
Implementation ComputingNode. 
PulseSensor
Computing property Set:
Initialize current drawn
Physical property Set:
Initialize Temperature, Power 
circuitry, Position of pulseox
begin cps annex
Impacting Parameters : Initialize current drawn, RF 
frequency
Impacted Parameters : tHumanTissue
Region Of Impact:
Physical Process{
Equation: Penn’s bio heat equation}
Region Boundary{
Equation: Circular Control Volume.}
Safety  Threshold: tHumanTissue < 38
Analysis Parameters :
Discretization {
xdir = 0.001,  ydir = 0.001, timeStep = 0.01
}
end annex
Declaration Physical System 
end Physical System;
Implementation Physical System.Human Tissue
Physical property set:
Initialize Blood perfusion , Thermal conductivity
end Physical System.Human Tissue
Figure 6.1: Modeling thermal side effects of computation of Body Sensor Networks using
AADL
internally depends on the state of pulse oximeter) , and RF frequency properties of the radio
are modeled as Computing system properties. The physical properties of pulse oximeter
such as power dissipation of the circuitry are modeled as physical system properties. Pulse
oximeter and the surrounding tissue is modeled as LCPS. Heating of tissue due to oper-
ations of pulse oximeter is a side effect, so it is modeled using RegionOfImpact(ROIm)
construct. The region of the human tissue around the pulse oximeter that get’s heated is
modeled as enclosing region construct. This region is modeled as a circular control volume.
The temperature rise of the human tissue is based on Penn’s equation (Equations 6.1 and
6.2) and is modeled using Physical Process construct. Sine Penn’s equation is a partial
differential equation and is solved numerically, additional information on the discretization
such as size of each cell in x direction and y direction, and the time step is provided as part
of Discretization construct. These models are explained in presented in Figure 6.2.
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Declaration GlobalCPS
end GlobCPS;
Implementation GlobalCPS.BSN
subcomponents
LocalCPS. Sensor1 … LocalCPS.Sesnor10
properties:
Cluster rotation sequence, rotation time
Declaration LocalCPS
end LocalCPS;
Implementation LocalCPS. Sensor1
subcomponets
ComputingNode. Sensor1
End LocalCPS. Sensor1
…….
Implementation LocalCPS. Sensor10
subcomponets
ComputingNode. Sensor10
End LocalCPS. Sensor10
Declaration ComputingNode
end ComputingNode;
Implementation ComputingNode. 
PulseSensor
Computing property Set:
Initialize current drawn
Physical property Set:
Initialize Temperature, Power 
circuitry, Position of pulseox
begin cps annex
Impacting Parameters : Initialize current drawn, 
RF frequency
Impacted Parameters : tHumanTissue
Region Of Impact:
Physical Process{
Equation: Penn’s bio heat equation
}
Region Boundary{
Equation: Circular Control Volume
}
Safety  Threshold: tHumanTissue < 39.2
Analysis Parameters :
Discretization {
xdir = 0.001,  ydir = 0.001, timeStep = 0.01
}
end annex
Additive Effect:
Equation: Add Power Values
Declaration Physical System 
end Physical System;
Implementation Physical System.Human Tissue
Physical property set:
Initialize Blood perfusion , Thermal conductivity
end Physical System.Human Tissue
Figure 6.2: Modeling communication side effects of Body Sensor Networks using AADL
Modeling thermal side-effects of BSN communication using CPS constructs
The thermal side effects of multi-hop BSN can be modeled using MCPS constructs in a
manner similar to Section 6.1. The cluster rotation sequence which tries to minimize the
heating of surrounding tissue is modeled as a property in AADL. Each computing node and
it’s interaction with the surrounding physical tissue is modeled as LCPS. As explained in
Chapter 3, due to proximity of computing sensors RegionOfImpacts of computing senors
can overlap, this situation is modeled using AdditiveEffect construct. In multi-hop BSN,
the aggregate side effect is equal to addition of SAR values of different sensors.
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Table 6.1: Skin temperatures after eight hours of pulse oximeter operation at different de-
vice temperatures (Burn threshold 39 ◦C)
Device Temperature Maximum Skin Temperature
43 ◦C 38.2 ◦C
43.5 ◦C 38.5 ◦C
44.0 ◦C 39.2 ◦C
44.5 ◦C 39.4 ◦C
45.0 ◦C 39.7 ◦C
Analysis Results and Verification
The pulse oximeter model presented in Section 6.1 was analyzed using safety analysis
algorithm (Chapter 5),to determine the safety of human tissue. The algorithm computes
the temperature at different points of skin using by solving Penn’s equation using FDTD ap-
proach. Table 6.1 shows the maximum temperature reached during eight hours of operation
of pulse oximeter at various device temperatures. A sample thermal map of temperature
distribution for pulse oximeter device temperature of 44 ◦C is shown in Figure 6.3. It can
be seen that the maximum temperature rise if 39.2 ◦C, which violates thermal safety re-
quirement. An experimental study done by [22] indicates that at pulse oximeter device
temperature of 44 ◦C blisters begin to appear on human skin.
In order to determine the tissue temperature rise due to communication operations
of BSN, Penn’s bio heat equation is solved using FDTD solvers. The aggregate side effect
is calculated by summing SAR values at each grid point. The power consumption of leader
worker node executing Ayushman application was 60mW, while that of non leader worker
node was 12mW. This power consumption was experimentally measured for TelosB motes
at 0 db - 7db radio attenuation. Each leadership sequence was operated for duration of
1000 sec and then for a duration of two days. The results for 100 seconds exposure match
with [40]. Table 6.2, shows temperature rise for different leadership sequences. The max-
imum temperature is less than 39 ◦C for all the cases. It can be observed from the results
that for short duration of exposure, temperature rise of different leadership sequences does
not vary. However for prolonged exposures, the leader ship sequence plays an important
role.
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Figure 6.3: Thermal map of fingertip skin for 8 hrs of pulse oximeter operation at 10 ◦C
temperature
Table 6.2: Tissue temperature rise for different leadership sequences (Burn threshold
39 ◦C)
Leadership Sequence
Maximum Tissue Temperature
1000 Sec Exposure 2 Days Exposure
(5 2 8 6 1 7 3 4 10 9) 37.1145 ◦C 37.1632 ◦C
(5 7 4 1 6 10 8 2 9 3) 37.1130 ◦C 37.1614 ◦C
(1 6 9 10 2 7 5 4 3 8) 37.1124 ◦C 37.1757 ◦C
(5 7 1 9 10 8 4 2 6 3) 37.1130 ◦C 37.1585 ◦C
6.2 Evaluating Safety of Autonomous Vehicles
This section presents a case study to apply the modeling and analysis framework for ver-
ifying safety of passengers traveling in an AV along a horizontal curve. Horizontal curves
are road segments that provide gradual transition between two tangential roadway strips.
The following subsections describe the scenario considered in the case study (Section 6.2),
AV’s behavior along horizontal curves (Section 6.2), modeling AV’s behavior and properties
of horizontal curve using MCPS constructs (Section 6.2), safety analysis (Section 6.2), and
validation of the safety analysis (Section 6.2).
Scenario Description
We consider an autonomous pickup truck (an AV) driving along Mile Post 44 (a horizontal
curve) on Arizona-83 highway [41]. Figure 6.4 shows direction of motion of the AV (the
dashed arrow in the figure) along the horizontal curve. The solid line in the figure represents
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the intended trajectory of the AV (as planned by the AV’s navigation subsystem) through the
right most lane. The trajectory is assumed to be along the center of the lane. The dashed
line (shown parallel to the planned trajectory of the AV) represents the guard rail beside the
right most lane. The distance between the guard rail and the AV is the sum of the shoulder
width and half the lane width. Table 6.4 lists: (i) the parameters of the curve such as curve
radius [41], distance between the AV and the guard rail [10], the coefficient of friction of
road [3], and the type of guard rail along the curve [9]; (ii) the parameters of the AV such
as type of AV (i.e. pickup truck), AV’s mass (i.e. the mass of a pickup truck) [9] and (iii)
the parameters related to the safety verification logic such as sampling time (i.e. the time
between two consecutive computations of AV’s speed) and the total time duration for which
safety analysis is performed. The next subsection describes the control algorithms that are
part of the AV.
Control Algorithms of the Autonomous Vehicle
We assume that the AV employs lateral and longitudinal control algorithms [32] as part of the
control subsystem. The lateral control algorithm generates steering angle (i.e lateral control
angle) based on AV’s current position and the next way point as given by the following
equation:
δ = arctan[2l(3y − xtanθ)/x2], (6.4)
where δ is the steering angle, l is the wheel base of the vehicle (i.e. ), (x, y) is the next way
point, and θ is the heading angle (i.e.). The longitudinal control algorithm generates speed
based on the preceding and following AV’s speed as per the equation given below:
vr = vp + k1(vp − vf ) + k2(Lr − Lm) (6.5)
where vr is the speed of the AV, vp is the speed of the preceding vehicle, Lr is the minimum
longitudinal distance between two vehicles, Lm is the measured inter vehicular distance,
k1 = m1‖Lr − Lm‖/‖Lr‖, k2 = m2k1, and m1 and m2 are control gains.
The vehicle dynamics of AV during planned motion is given by [26]:
x′ = vr ∗ cosθ, y′ = vr ∗ sinθ, θ= vr
l
∗ tanδ, (6.6)
where l is the wheel base of the vehicle.
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Table 6.3: Abbreviated Injury Scale
AIS SEVERITY TYPE OF INJURY
0 None None
1 Minor Superficial Injury
2 Moderate Recoverable
3 Serious Possibly Recoverable
4 Severe Not Fully Recoverable Without Care
5 Critical Not Fully Recoverable with Care
6 Fatal Unsurvivable
We assume that the speed of the autonomous pickup truck is also within the ob-
served speed limits. For the case study, we assume that any preceding and following
vehicle have the same speed as that of the autonomous pickup truck. They are not shown
in figure 6.4 since there would be no collision among the vehicles; thus causing no safety
hazard. From safety verification perspective however it is important to analyze the probabil-
ity of passenger injury because of collision with the guard rail when the AV skids because
of speeding along the horizontal curve. The posted speed limit on the curve is 45 MPH.
However, the observed speed of vehicles is 45-60 MPH [41]. From our observation, based
on vehicle behavior (described in Section 6.2) the minimum speed at which the AV can skid
is 48MPH on this horizontal curve.
Passenger Safety
The speed of the AV has an impact on the passenger safety when it skids. The passenger
traveling in an AV is considered unsafe if the probability of a serious injury (Table 6.3) is
greater than zero. The probability of serious injury, given the change in vehicle velocity in a
collision is x, is computed in the safety verification logic using the following equation:
P =
1
1 + exp(4.0139− 0.1252x) . (6.7)
In order to compute the probability of serious passenger injury in the safety verification
logic, it is important to determine the speed and the angle at which the AV collides with the
guard rail. These parameters can be obtained by analyzing the behavior of AV along the
curve. The following subsection describes AV’s behavior given the lateral and longitudinal
control operations. The safety verification logic is then validated in Section 6.2 by comparing
the computed serious injury probability with the probability of serious injury in a pickup
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Figure 6.4: Autonomous Vehicle driving along a Horizontal Curve, r1 is the radius of lane 2
Table 6.4: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Coefficient of
Static Friction
0.2 Radius of lane 1 50m
Mass of Vehicle
1
1600kg Mass of Vehicle 2 2000kg
Sampling Time 0.005s Type of Guard Rail W-
Bean
truck due to speeding along the same road segment based on data provided in AZ-83
assessment report [41].
Autonomous Vehicle’s Behavior Along a Horizontal Curve
Speed of an AV can be used to characterize its behavior along horizontal curve by curvi-
linear equations of motion [18]. These equations are explained briefly using a free body
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diagram shown in Figure 6.4. In the figure, rlane denotes the radius of the cure, vr is
the instantaneous velocity of AV (represented by OB), Fcentrifugal and Fsfriction represent
centrifugal and frictional forces acting on it. Fcentrifugal is an outward acting force that
pushes the vehicle away from the center O, whereas Fsfriction provides necessary traction
towards the center. Net force Fnormal acting on a vehicle is the difference of these two
forces (Equation 6.9), to negotiate a curve without skidding, this force should be negative
(Equation 6.10). However, if the condition is violated, the vehicle will skid tangentially (same
as direction of its instantaneous velocity) and collide with the guard rail. The angle ( show
as β) at which the AV collides the guard rail is called the impact angle. This angle is equal
to 6 AOB because if we draw at tangent at point A, β is equal to 90 ◦ - 6 OAB, which is same
as 6 AOB. Thus, 6 AOB given by Equation 6.8
β = arccos
rlane
rlane+ ws
. (6.8)
where: ws: width of shoulder between guard rail and lane rlane: radius of lane β: impact
angle
Fnormal = Fcentrifugal − Fsfriction. (6.9)
Fnormal < 0. (6.10)
In the next subsection, the behavior of AV along a horizontal curve using MCPS
constructs is modeled. These models are also implemented using AADL [2], and is shown
in figure 6.5.
Modeling using MCPS constructs
AV’s properties such as it’s mass, velocity, steering angle, wheel base, and its type (i.e.
pickup truck) are modeled as computing properties. Sampling time and quantization
parameters of A/D, D/A connectors that interface sensors and actuators with the physical
dynamics of AV are modeled as computing properties. Velocity (a.k.a. impact velocity)
and angle (a.k.a. impact angle) at which the AV collides with the guard rails are impacting
parameters. The properties of the curve, i.e. radius, coefficient of friction of road, type of
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guard rail, distance between the AV and the guard rail are Physical System Parameters.
Human injury is an impacted parameter. The behavior of an AV during skid is modeled as
UIROm. Equation 6.10, which provides the condition for a vehicle to skid, is specified using
the Minimum Threshold construct. Equation 6.8, which represents tangential direction of
AV’s skid, is modeled using Computing Mobility.
The velocity of an AV after collision (a.k.a. final velocity) with guard rail depends on
the impact velocity and impact angle. This relation is shown in Table 6.5 and is specified
using the Physical Process construct. The table is obtained by using LSDyna simulation
software [6]. Pickup truck and guard rail models from [9] are input to the simulator. The
probability of serious passenger injury given the difference of final and impact velocity (as
shown in Equation 6.7) is modeled using Physical Process construct. The behavior of AV
along planned trajectory generated by its navigation system can be modeled using IROm
construct. The output trajectory is modeled by Computing Mobility construct. The lateral
and longitudinal control algorithms (i.e. the Equations 6.2 and 6.5, respectively) are mod-
eled using Physical Process sub construct. In order for the AV to be safe, the probability
of serious passenger injury should not be greater than zero, this condition is modeled by
the Safety Threshold construct. The next subsection describes the application of generic
safety verification algorithm to analyze the safety of passengers in this case study.
Safety Analysis
Based on the MCPS model, the safety verification logic (presented in Table 1) is used to
compute the probability of serious injury to passengers. Figure 6.6 shows the mapping of
different stages of the safety verification logic 1 to steps used for analyzing the safety of
passengers.
We determine the speed of AV (an impacting parameter) using using Longitudinal
Control Algorithm specified as part of Physical Process in IROM construct, (Step 3)). The
speed is checked to determine if there is a skid by using equations specified in Minimum
Threshold construct (Step 4). If the condition is satisfied we compute impact angle (an
impacting parameter) and final velocity after the collision with guard rail. The final velocity
is then used to compute probability of serious human injury (an impacted parameter). We
finally check if the probability is greater than zero (a safety threshold) to declare the system
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begin Implementation MCPS: 
Motion_HorizontalCurves
subcomponents
LCPS1, LCPS4
properties:
initalize Physical_System_Property_Set
end
begin Declaration MCPS
end
begin Declaration Local CPS
end
begin Declaration Local CPS
end
begin Implementation Local CPS: LCSP1
subcomponents
AutonomousVehicle1
End
begin Implementation Local CPS: LCSP2
subcomponents
GuardRail
end
begin mcps annex
Impacting Parameters : impact velocity, 
impact angle
Minimum Threshold :
{
Equation: Necessary condition for skid
}
Impacted Parameters : Occupant Injury
Unintended Region Of Mobility:
Physical Process{
Equation: Evaluate impact velocity and 
impact angle
Get Final Velocity from Table 3.
Equation: Compute probability of serious 
injury
}
Safety  Threshold: Occupant Injury < AIS 3
Monitored Parameters : Position
Intended Region of Mobility:
Physical Process {
Set of way points corresponding to 
trajectory
Equation: Lateral Control Algorithm
Equation : Longitudinal Control Algorithm
}
Analysis Parameters :
Time Duration, Sampling Time
end annex
begin Declaration
Computing_Properties_Set
MassOfAV, velocityOfAV, typeOfAV
end
begin Declaration Physical_System
end
begin Implementation Physical_system: 
Guard Rail
Properties:
initalize Physical_system_Property_Set
end
begin Declaration
PhysicalSystem_Properties_Set
CoefficientOfFriction, Radius_Curve, 
Type of Guard Rail, WidthOfShoulder
end
begin Declaration Local CPS
end
begin Implementation
Computing_System: 
AutonomousVehicle1
properties:
initalize Computing_Property_Set
initalize
Computing_Mobility_Properties_Set
end
begin Declaraion
Computing_System
end
Figure 6.5: Modeling the motion of Autonomous Vehicle Along Horizontal Curves using
AADL
Table 6.5: Relation between Final velocity, Impact Velocity and Impact Angle for Pick Up
Truck computed using LS-Dyna
Impact Velocity
(m/s)
Impact
Angle
(degrees)
Final
Velocity
(m/s)
27(60MPH) 8.4 24.7
26.5 (59MPH) 8.4 24.5
26.1 (58MPH) 8.4 23.8
25.7 (57MPH) 8.4 23.3
25.2(56MPH) 8.4 23.5
24.7 (55MPH) 8.4 22.7
24.3(54MPH) 8.4 22.5
23.8(53MPH) 8.4 22
23.4(52 MPH) 8.4 21.6
22.9 (51MPH) 8.4 22.5
22.5(50MPH) 8.4 21
22.0(49MPH) 8.4 20.2
21.6(48MPH) 8.4 21.6
21.1(47MPH) 8.4 21.15
20.7(46MPH) 8.4 20.7
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Compute vehicle velocity using
Longitudinal control Algorithm
yes
Compute Impact angle and 
impact velocity
Find final velocity from table 
V
Based on impact angle and
Impact velocity
Compute difference of final 
and final impact velocity and 
determine probability of 
serious injury
no
no
yes
Step 3
Step 4
Step 21-22
Step 23
Is ctime < 
time 
duration
yes
no
Step 1
Step 24 Step 34
Step 2
Step 36
Increment ctime by sampling 
time
System is safeSystem is unsafe
Is 
probabilit
y > 0
Check if 
there is a 
skid
Set ctime = 0
yes
Start
End
Figure 6.6: Analysis Steps in Case study
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as unsafe (Step 24) or continue with the next iteration (Step 2).
Validation
In order to evaluate the correctness of safety analysis algorithm we computed the probabil-
ity of severe injury to passengers traveling in the autonomous pick up truck along MP 44
and compared it with the probability of having serious accident by a pick up truck due to
speeding along MP44 based on the data provided in AZ-83 report [41]. META STATEMENT.
We assume the speed of AV follows a normal distribution with mean of 55 MPH and stan-
dard deviation of 6.8. These values are based on data published by Arizona Department
of transportation which indicates that speed distribution along the highways forms a normal
distribution [1]. The report further states that the mean and standard deviation parameters
of the distribution along I-10 Grant Road ATR, which has a posted speed limit of 55MPH, is
65 MPH and 10.0 respectively. Since most of vehicles going on Mile Post 44 of AZ-83 are
speeding, we computed scaled mean and standard deviation values for speeding vehicles
along I-10 and used it as the speed distribution of AV.
The validation has two steps:
• Probability of serious injury computed by safety verification logic along MP44
on AZ-83: We computed the probability of serious injury (column 4 in table 6.6) at
each speed between 45-60MPH using safety verification logic and multiplied it with
the probability distribution function (column 5 in table 6.6). We added up all the
resulting values to determine the probability of serious injury along MP44.
• Probability of serious injury as per [41]: Authors in [41] report that the total
number of accidents during 2002-2008 along MP 44 were 240. Out of these 10 per
cent of accidents were due to pick up trucks, 14 percent of these accidents were
serious in nature( incapacitated injury, fatal injury etc), 74 percent of these accidents
were due to speeding. Multiplying all these values gives the total number of accidents
due to speeding and by a pickup truck leading to serous passenger injury as 3.12,
dividing this value by 240 gives the probability which is 0.013.
The probability of serious injury to passengers traveling in a pick up truck as computed by
safety verification logic at MP44 on AZ-83 is 0.014, whereas the probability of serious injury
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Table 6.6: Probability of serious injury at different speeds computed by Safety Verification
Logic
Impact Velocity
(m/s)
Final
Velocity
(m/s)
Difference
of Fi-
nal and
Impact
Velocity
(m/s)
Probability
of Serious
Injury
Probability
Of AV
having this
speed
27(60MPH) 24.7 2.3 0.023 0.044
26.5 (59MPH) 24.5 2.0 0.023 0.050
26.1 (58MPH) 23.8 2.3 0.023 0.053
25.7 (57MPH) 23.3 2.4 0.024 0.056
25.2(56MPH) 23.5 1.7 0.022 0.058
24.7 (55MPH) 22.7 2.0 0.023 0.058
24.3(54MPH) 22.5 1.8 0.022 0.058
23.8(53MPH) 22 1.85 0.022 0.056
23.4(52 MPH) 21.6 1.8 0.022 0.053
22.9 (51MPH) 22.5 0.4 0.020 0.049
22.5(50MPH) 21 1.5 0.021 0.044
22.0(49MPH) 20.2 1.85 0.022 0.040
21.6(48MPH) 21.6 0 0.017 0.034
21.1(47MPH) 21.15 0 0.017 0.024
20.7(46MPH) 20.7 0 0.017 0.020
to passengers given that there is an accident is 0.013 as per [41].
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Chapter 7
Discussion
The modeling constructs proposed in this thesis have benefits such as i) application to
complex scenarios, and ii)usability
• Applicability to complex scenarios: The modeling constructs can be used by system
designers to model the behavior of heterogeneous AVs along various road segments
(e.g., curve roads, and straight roads) and under various disturbances (e.g., presence
of ice and high speed winds). This is achieved by allowing AV’s behavior, physical
world characteristics, and CPIs to be modeled in a modular manner (as shown in
Figure 7.1). AVs are abstracted into different types (e.g., sedan, pickup-truck, coupe
and trailer) based on their characteristics (e.g., safety attributes, sensor errors, and
control algorithms). Road geometry and external disturbances are abstracted as part
of the physical world. AV behavior is abstracted based on its type, physical world,
and the CPIs (abstracted by the IROm and UIROm constructs). These abstractions
can then be instantiated based on the scenario to be analyzed. For example, if the
scenario includes fifty coupes, then fifty instances of coupe behavior can be created
as part of the model (without requiring repeated definition of the vehicles). Further,
combining simple scenarios can yield more complex ones. For example, CPS models
of sedans on a curved road can be combined with coupe models moving on the
straight highway to model a scenario where sedans are entering a highway using
ramps and coupes are already moving on it.
• Usability: The CPS modeling constructs capture the semantics of planned and un-
planned motions using intuitive and well defined constructs (i.e IROm and UIROM).
As such, the modeling constructs and the verification algorithm can be applied by the
system engineers to perform safety verification without requiring any specific analyti-
cal expertise. Further, the CPS modeling constructs are generic in nature and can be
applied to specify different types of control behavior or even in different domains.
In this thesis, CPS modeling constructs have been applied to BSN and AV’s for
doing safety verification. The modeling abstractions and safety verification algorithm are
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Type of AV Safety 
Features
Sensor 
Errors
Type of 
Control
Algorithm
Sedan S +/-2% PID
Pickup- Truck SA +/-3% Model 
Predictive
Trailer SAB +/-1% Robust
Coupe SABT +/-4% Hybrid 
Control
External  
Disturbances
Presence of Ice
Uneven Road
High Speed 
Winds
Curve Road 
Radius of Curve
Banking
Number of  Lanes
Coefficient of 
Friction
Straight Highway
Width of Lane
Number of Lanes
Coefficient of 
Friction
Sedan’s behavior on
curved road with ice
Coupe’s behavior on 
curved road
Pick up truck’s  behavior 
on curved road with  unenven
road
Coupe’s behavior
on  straight  road 
Models for different AV Types (with example values in the table)
• Inherit generic behavior 
from type models for an 
instance of AV.
• Initialize individual AV’s 
and physical world models  
based on the scenario to 
be analyzed. Multiple 
sedans
Multiple 
coupes
Multiple 
coupes
Multiple
Pickup-trucks
MCPS models of  multiple 
sedans and coupes moving 
on a curved road
Muliptle
sedans
Mulitple
coupes
Sedan’s behavior 
on curved road
Physical World models
AV Type models supplemented 
with  planned and  unplanned 
interactions to create 
abstractions of AV behavior
Safety Features:
S: Seat Belt
A: Air Bag
B: Anti lock breaking system
T: Traction control system
Combine models
Resulting model
MCPS models of pickup-trucks 
and coupes moving on a straight 
road
Addition of  MCPS models  of coupes (on 
straight hwy) and  sedans (on a curve), 
model the merging of sedans on a highway 
where coupes are moving.
Abstraction of AVs, Physical 
World, and AV behavior
Instantiation of Modeling 
Abstractions for a Scenario
Figure 7.1: Modeling abstractions and their instantiation for specific scenario.
however generic and can be applied to diverse domains such as first responder applica-
tions, e.g., a building under fire. In such a scenario, first responders use mobile ad hoc
network infrastructure to communicate among themselves as well as use location informa-
tion provided by fire sensors to identify severe damages. Due to extreme temperatures
inside the building, there can be localization errors [17] as a result, fire fighters can often
be redirected to incorrect locations thereby delaying the help to disaster victims. We can
model the incorrect locations and the behavior of sensor under extreme temperatures using
Unintended Region Of Mobility (UIRom) and Physical Process constructs. The safety
criteria will be a threshold based on victim’s physiological state under smoke asphyxiation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, i have proposed modeling constructs and safety verification algorithm that al-
lows system engineers to model the behavior of a sytem from CPS perspective and analyze
the safety of physical system. The modeling constructs allows specification of system ar-
chitectural abstraction of various components in CPSs and the inter-dependencies of these
components. These abstractions are further modular in nature that can capture the seman-
tics of intended, unintended, planned and unplanned interactions from the computing units
(e.g., BSN and AVs) to the physical world. Instantiation of the modularized abstractions
for specific scenarios yields representation of corresponding architectural models. The ab-
straction along with its instantiation allows for modeling complex scenarios with heteroge-
neous computing units. We demonstrated the use of modeling constructs and verification
algorithm for an AV moving along a horizontal curve on AZ-83 highway and BSN performing
computing and communication operations.
The current work can be extended in multiple ways. Firstly, the formal semantics
of the constructs needs to be developed. Formal semantics can be primarily specified in
three ways, i) denotational semantics, ii) axiomatic semantics, and iii) structural operational
semantics (SOS). In denotational semantics, information about a construct is passed as
arguments to a function which returns it’s semantic value on execution. In axiomatic se-
mantics, formal semantics are defined using Hoare triples [27] on language constructs. In
SOS, formal semantics are defined using using Labelled Transition Systems (LTS). An LTS
consists of a set of states and a transition relation between them. States intuitively rep-
resent language constructs whereas transitions are based on the abstract syntax of the
language. More information on applying SOS to modeling languages can be found at [46]
and references with in it. A brief survey of several other techniques published in literature for
specifying syntax and semantics of modeling languages can be found at [30]. Secondly, the
modeling constructs and safety verification logic needs to be applied to other domains such
as mobile ad hoc networks to determine the generality of the constructs. Thirdly, model
transformation techniques for converting architectural models specified in AADL to formal
models in Spatio-Temporal hybrid automata needs to be developed. This transformation
47
will help in performing formal safety verification using reachability analysis [25].
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